The certificate-based signature is an attractive cryptography primitive whose original motivation is to simplify certificate's management and to eliminate key escrow problem. The proxy signature is another cryptography paradigm which permits an entity to delegate his signing rights to another. In this paper, we first note that certificate-based signatures and proxy signatures have something in common, and analyze the relationship between the certificate-based signatures and the proxy signatures. Secondly, we introduce a generic construction of the proxy signature CBS-to-PS from a previous secure certificate-based signature, and prove that our CBS-to-PS scheme is secure if the underlying certificatebased signature scheme is secure. Finally, we give a concrete application for our CBS-to-PS as an example.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of certificate-based cryptography (CBC) was first introduced by Gentry [1] to integrate the merits of identity-based cryptography (IBC) [2] into public key cryptography (PKC) in Eurocrypt 2003, whose original motivation is to simplify the certificate management procedures, including revocation, storage, distribution and verification of certificates in conventional PKC, and to overcome key escrow problem in IBC. In 2004, the notion of certificate-based signature (CBS) was first proposed by Kang et al. [3] following the idea of Gentry's CBC. A CBS scheme includes a Certificate Authority (CA) and a user, also called signer, the user generates his own private/public key and requests an up-todate certificate from the CA, while the certificate in a CBS is implicitly used as a part of signing key. In this way, there is no inspection of genuineness about the certificates. The CBS achieves the same trust level (Level 3) [4] of the authority as that of the conventional PKC, and does not suffer to the Denial-of-Decryption (DoD) attack [5] if we use certificate as a part of signing key. Therefore, CBS has become a topic of active research in cryptography. Since Kang et al. ' s seminal paper [3] , the security model of CBS and the formally definition of the key replacement attack have been introduced by Li et al. in 2007 [6] . Then Au et al. constructed a certificatebased (linkable) ring signature scheme [7] in the same year, and Liu et al. [8] proposed two CBS schemes in 2008 one was a scheme without pairings, the other was proved for its security in the standard model. Unfortunately, Zhang [9] pointed out that Liu et al.'s scheme [8] [11] , etc., including many extensions of the basic certificate-based signature schemes, like Chen and Huang's certificate-based proxy signature scheme [12] , Huang et al.'s certificate-based blind signature scheme [13] , and so on.
Proxy signature is another cryptography paradigm used for delegating the signing rights. The seminal concept of proxy signature was invented by Mambo et al. in 1996 [14] . In a proxy signature scheme, there are two entities involved, namely, an original signer and a proxy signer. An original signer can delegate its signing power to a proxy signer, who can thus sign on behalf of the original signer. The proxy signature plays an important role in cases when a user wants to delegate his signing right to the other user [15] [16] [17] , such as mobile agent, mobile communications, distributed networks, grid computing, and e-commerce etc., where delegation of signing rights is commonly required. In Mambo et al.'s seminal paper [14] , the delegation types were categorized into three levels of delegation: full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant. So far, there are a number of proxy signature schemes proposed for each, including partial delegation [14, 18] , delegation by warrant [15] , and partial delegation with warrant [19, 20] , etc.
Although they are different forms of signatures, but the certificate-based signature and the proxy signature have something in common. In this paper, we first discuss the relationship between the certificate-based signature and the proxy signature delegated by warrant (PS). Secondly, we convert the previous certificate-based signature scheme to the proxy signature scheme, namely, we propose a generic construction of the proxy signatures CBS-to-PS from the previous certificate-based signatures. Then, we give a security proof to prove our generic construction CBS-to-PS is secure only if the underlying CBS scheme is secure, in other words, our CBS-to-PS scheme is secure only if the underlying CBS scheme is secure. Finally, as an example, we construct a concrete application for our generic construction CBS-to-PS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the related definitions of CBS and PS briefly, including the formal definition, adversary types and security model for CBS and PS. In Section 3, we first analyze the similarities, differences and relationships between the certificate-based signatures and the proxy signatures delegated by warrant, and propose a generic construction of CBS-to-PS and give a security proof for our CBS-to-PS. In Section 4, we give a concrete application example for our CBS-to-PS. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the related preliminaries including the formal definition and the security model for CBS and PS.
Certificate-based Signature
We refer [6] to review the formal definition and the security model for the certificate-based signature in this section. We use the prefix CB-to denote a CBS system for convenience below. .
The Formal Definition
In a certificate-based signature scheme, there are two participants involved, including a CA and a user.
Definition 2.1. (CBS).
A certificate-based signature scheme is defined by the following five algorithms:
• CB-Setup(k)→(CB-params,mpk,msk): The algorithm inputs a security parameter k , outputs the system public parameters CB params − and the CA's master key pair ( , ) mpk msk , where CB params − is the system public parameters except the system master public key mpk , such as the descriptions about the groups, hash functions etc.
• CB-UserKeyGen(CB-params,ID)→(SK ID 
Attack Model
In this section, we will recall security model of certificate-based signatures, which is defined by two games between an adversary
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A A A ∈ and a challenger C. A and a challenger C is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. (CB-Game1
• CB-Setup: For a given security parameter k , the challenger C runs the algorithm CB Setup − to obtain the system public parameters CB params − and the sys- A win CB ! Game1 and CB ! Game2 respectively is negligible.
Proxy Signature
We refer [21] to review the formal definition and the security model of the proxy signature in this section. We will use the prefix PS-to denote a PS system for convenience below.
The Formal Definition
In a proxy signature scheme, there are two participants involved, including an original signer O and a proxy signer P.
Definition 2.5. (PS).
A proxy signature scheme is defined by the following five algorithms:
• PS-Setup(k)→(PS-params): The algorithm inputs a security parameter k, outputs the system public parameters PS params − .
• PS-KeyGen(PS-params)→(SK O ,PK O ,SK P ,PK P ):
The algorithm consists of the following two subalgorithms:
• 
Adversarial Types
In a proxy signature scheme, we are concerned with three different types of attackers, by an outside adversary, a malicious proxy signer and a malicious original signer, respectively. We want a proxy signature scheme to be secure against these three adversaries, namely A simulates a malicious proxy signer which holds the private key of the proxy signer, and the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer.
• A 2 : Type 2 adversary 2 A simulates a malicious original signer which holds the private key of the original signer, and the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer.
• A 3 : Type 3 adversary 3 A simulates an outside adversary which only holds the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer.
Attack Model
We want a proxy signature scheme to be existentially unforgeable against each of the above three adversaries. But if a proxy signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against Types 1 and Type 2 adversaries, then it is also existentially unforgeable against a Type 3 adversary in evidence. So we only consider a proxy signature to be existentially unforgeable against Type 1 and Type 2 adversaries. The existential unforgeability of a proxy signature scheme is defined by the following games between adversaries and the challenger.
(1) PS-Game1. The game between a Type 1 adversary 1 A and a challenger C is defined as follows:
• PS-Setup: For a given security parameter k , the challenger C runs the algorithm PS Setup • PS-Query Oracles: Type 1 adversary 1 A can adaptively issue the following queries in polynomial time.
1)DelQuery:
The adversary A 1 issues DelQuery(w i ) for a warrant w i , the challenger C returns a delegation D wi to A 1 .
2)PSignQuery:
The A and a challenger C is defined as follows:
• PS-Setup: For a given security parameter k, the chal- • PS-Query Oracles: Type 2 adversary 2 A can adaptively issue the PSignQuery in polynomial time.
• PSignQuery:
The adversary • PS-Output: Finally, 2 A outputs a forged signature * σ on the message * m under the warrant * w .
We say 2 A wins Game2 if σ * is a valid proxy signature σ * on the message m * under the warrant w* and (m*, w*) has never been submitted to PSignQuery .
Definition 2.6. (Unforgeability of PS).
A proxy signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks if the probability of success that any polynomial bounded adversary A 1 and 
PS Game
− and 2 PS Game − , respectively, is negligible.
THE GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF PS FROM CBS
Note that there are some conditions common between the certificate-based signatures and the proxy signatures delegated by warrant, in this section, we firstly analyze the similarities and differences between CBS and PS, then propose a generic construction of the proxy signatures CBS-to-PS from the previous certificate-based signatures, and give a security proof for our CBS-to-PS.
Comparison of CBS and PS
Although at the first glance, CBS and the PS are completely different concepts, but we have been able to find some common grounds between a PS scheme and a CBS scheme.
• In a CBS scheme, the role of CA is similar to that of the original signer in a PS scheme, both of them should generate an authorization for another signer, that is, a certificate for the user in a CBS scheme or a delegation for the proxy signer in a PS scheme. The role of the user in a CBS scheme is similar to that of the proxy signer in a PS scheme, both of them should generate a valid signature by using their own private key and authorization information.
• The CBS scheme and the PS scheme both involve two entities, and one of them must generate an authorization (certificate or delegation) for the other one. In a certificated-based signature scheme, there are two entities involved, namely, a CA and a user, and the CA generates a certificate which includes a user's identity and public key, while in a proxy signature scheme, there are two entities involved as well, namely, an original signer O and a proxy signer P and the original signer O generates a delegation which includes the type of security policy for the proxy signer and the original signer.
• The CBS scheme and the PS scheme both require two pieces of secret information when they sign on a message. In a PS scheme, it will take both the proxy signer's private key and a delegation corresponding to the warrant information for signing a message, similarly, in a CBS scheme, it will take both user's private key and a certificate corresponding to user's public key for signing a message.
The Generic Construction of CBS-to-PS
We describe how to convert a previous CBS scheme to a PS scheme in this section. Namely, we now show a generic construction for CBS-to-PS as follows. For convenience, we let CB Π denote a CBS scheme with five algorithms: CB-
Setup, CB-UserKeyGen, CB-CertGen, CB-Sign, and CBVerify, PS
Π denote a proxy signature scheme with five algorithms: PS-Setup, PS-KeyGen, PS-DelGen, PS-PSign, and PS-Verify throughout the paper.
• PS-Setup: The algorithm inputs a security parameter k, runs CB ! Setup(k) of ! CB to get CB ! params , mpk and msk . Sets PS ! params = CB ! params , SK O = msk, PK O = mpk. The algorithm outputs PS ! params as the system public parameters of PS Π .
• PS-KeyGen: The algorithm consists of the following two sub-algorithms:
• PS-OKeyGen: The algorithm outputs the original signer O's key pair (SK O , PK O ) , which is already obtained in PS Setup − phase.
• PS-PKeyGen: We denote P the proxy signer's identity. The algorithm inputs the system public parameters PS ! params . Sets CB ! params = PS ! params , ID = P, first runs CB ! UserKeyGen (CB ! params, ID) of ! CB to get (SK ID , PK ID ) , then sets SK P = SK ID , PK P = PK ID . The algorithm outputs the proxy signer P's key pair (SK P , PK P ) .
• PS-DelGen: The algorithm inputs the system public parameters PS ! params , the original signer O's pri- 
D Cert =
, outputs the delegation D w which corresponds to the warrant w .
• PS-PSign: The algorithm inputs a message m to be signed, the system public parameters PS params − , a warrant w and the corresponding delegation D w , the proxy signer P's private key SK P . The algorithm sets
CB params PS params
Π to get a signature σ , outputs σ as a proxy signature on the message m .
• PS-Verify: The algorithm inputs the message/signature pair (m,! ) , the system public parameters PS params − , a warrant w and the corresponding delegation w D , the original signer O's public key PK O , the proxy signer P's public key PK P . The al- 
Security Proof for CBS-to-PS Theorem 1 (Unforgeability of CBS-to-PS).
The constructed CBS-to-PS scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attack only if the underlying CBS scheme is secure. 
Lemma 1. The constructed CBS-to-PS
CB Game
− for underlying CBS scheme as follows. Let CB C be a challenger of the CBS scheme.
• PS-Setup: Lets P denote the identity of a proxy sign-
CB ! UserKeyGen(CB ! params, P) of ! CB to obtain the proxy signer P's key pair (SK P , PK P ) returns {CB ! params,mpk,SK P , PK P } to CB ! A I , CB ! A I sets PS params CB params
• PS-Query Oracles: Type 1 adversary PS ! A 1 can adaptively submit the following query oracles: 2)PSign Query:
and issues
SignQuery(m j , ID i , PK IDi ) to obtain a signature forgery ! j .
The challenger CB C returns ! j to CB ! A I ; 1)
• PS-Output: Finally, PS ! A I outputs a forged proxy signature (m*,! *, w*) on the message * m under the warrant * w . CB ! A II sets ID* = P || w* , PK ID* = PK P , outputs (m*,! *, ID*, PK ID* ) as a CBS forgery. If * σ is a valid PS under the warrant * w on the message * m , then * σ must be a valid CBS under the identity * ID and the public key PK ID* . That is, if we forge a PS signature * σ successfully, then the signature * σ must be a valid forgery for CBS. So the constructed CBS-to-PS scheme is secure if underlying CBS scheme is secure. The process is shown in Fig. (1) . • PS-Setup: Let P denote the identity of a proxy signer. The process is shown in Fig. (2) .
Lemma 2. The constructed CBS-to-PS
A CONCRETE EXAMPLE FOR CBS-TO-PS
We give an example for our CBS-to-PS in this section.
Review of CBS Scheme
Now, we review a previous certificate-based signature scheme [6] briefly, it consists of the following five algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, let 1 G , 2 G be groups of prime order q . • UserKeyGen: Given the system public parameters params , user's identity {0,1}* ID ∈ , the algorithm picks * ID q s Z ∈ at random and computes PK ID = s ID P , then the user's key pair is (s ID , PK ID ) .
• CertGen: Given the system public parameters params , the system master secret key s , user's identity ID and his public key PK ID , the algorithm computes Q ID = H 0 (ID || PK ID ) and outputs a certificate Cert ID = sQ ID , which can be verified by checking
• Fig. (2) . The process of proof for Game2 of CBS-to-PS.
whether the equation e(Cert ID , P) = e(mpk,Q ID ) holds.
• Sign: Given a message m , the system public parameters params , user's identity ID and his private key • Verify: Given a message/signature pair (m,! ) , the system public parameters params , the system master public key mpk , and user's public key PK ID , the algorithm performs as follows: ID ID e V P e mpk Q e W PK e W U =
The PS Scheme from CBS-to-PS
We construct a PS scheme from the previous CBS scheme which is described in section 4.1 by using our generic construction of CBS-to-PS. The constructed proxy signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup: The system parameters generated are as same as the Section 4.1. The algorithm outputs the system public parameters
• KeyGen: The algorithm consists of the following two sub-algorithms: • PSign: Given a message {0,1}* m ∈ , the system public parameters params , a warrant w and the corresponding delegation D w , the proxy signer P's key pair (SK P , PK P ) , the algorithm performs as follows: a) Picks e(V , P) = e(PK O ,Q w )e(W 1 , PK P )e(W 2 ,U )
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we firstly analyze the similarities and differences between the certificate-based signatures and the proxy signatures delegated by warrant. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of the proxy signatures CBS-to-PS from the certificate-based signatures, then, we prove that our CBS-to-PS scheme is secure against all types of adversaries of PS if the underlying CBS scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attack. Finally, we give a concrete CBS-to-PS scheme as an example to demonstrate the application of our generic construction. Further, we can also research the generic construction of the certificate-based signatures from the proxy signatures.
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